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Silicon Valley, thirty miles south of San Francisco, is the world's
technology hub. There are more start-ups in key areas like networking,
wireless communications, multimedia, and internet applications here than
anywhere else in the world.' This technological production has trans-
formed the Silicon Valley into one of the most important money-
generating regions of America. In 1994, Silicon Valley firms surpassed
$106 billion in sales2 and were expanding their markets internationally,
most notably to the Pacific Rim's booming markets. By 1996, the Valley
achieved its status as the nation's largest source of exports.3 More than
131,000 jobs have been created since 1992,' totaling 900,000 by 1996. 5
Silicon Valley also boasts the nation's highest average wages of nearly
$45,000.6
* J.D. candidate, 1997, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.S.
Economics, 1988, University of California, Davis. The author gained extensive insight into
hiring practices of Silicon Valley high-technology companies from her experience as a technical
recruiter prior to attending law school. The author wishes to thank Riaz Karamali, Esq., Ji-
Young Lee, and Erin Giacoppo for their input and encouragement; the HIJ team for its editing
effort; and Gibson Dunn & Crutcher L.L.P. for supplying the resources for this Note. This
Note is dedicated to my dear husband Dennis Gregory Eve and my mother Huong Thi Huynh.
1. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, at vii (1994).
2. See id. at ix.
3. Telephone interview with Stephen Levy, Director of Studies, Center for Continuing
Study of California Economy. The Silicon Valley boasted $35 billion in exports, compared to
$826 billion for the nation. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
1996 (116th ed.).
4. See Scott Thurm, Silicon Valley: Victim Of Its Own Success, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEws, Jan. 13, 1997, at 1E.
5. See Levy, supra note 3.
6. See Thurm, supra note 4.
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Many observers believe that the success of the Silicon Valley has
been a result of a unique "regional network-based industrial system that
promotes collective learning and flexible adjustment among specialized
producers of ... related technologies."' The Valley's fluid industrial
structure accommodates rapid dissemination of information and techno-
logical changes.8 The region's networks operate as a kind of meta-
organization through which engineers, in shifting combinations, create
technological advances. 9 Engineers move between firms and projects
frequently, taking the knowledge, skills, and experience acquired at their
previous jobs, and then using them as building blocks in their new jobs. a0
Indeed, job-hopping has become the norm, with job tenure averaging
about two years. I" One engineer explained the ease of changing jobs in
the Silicon Valley as follows:
If you left Texas Instruments for another job, it was a major psycho-
logical move, all the way to one coast or the other, or at least as far as
Phoenix. Out here, it wasn't that big a catastrophe to quit your job on
Friday and have another job on Monday .... You didn't necessarily
even have to tell your wife. You just drove off in another direction on
Monday morning. You didn't have to sell your house, and your kids
didn't have to change schools.1
2
This accumulation of technical knowledge enhances the viability of
Silicon Valley start-ups and reinforces a shared technical culture. 3 In-
deed, the speed of the diffusion of technical skills and know-how is the
key to the Silicon Valley's success. 4
The California courts have contributed to the Silicon Valley's suc-
cess by allowing employee mobility to take place. The courts have
thwarted employers' attempts to restrain employees from jumping ship.'
As a result, most employers have come to accept a high turnover rate as a
cost of doing business in the region. 6 Thus, engineers move between
7. SAXENIAN, supra note 1, at 2; see, e.g., RICHARD GORDON, INNOVATION,
INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY REGIONS, in INNOVATION NETwoRKS:
SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE (R. Camagni ed., 1991) (contending that the flow of information and
ideas between companies is the key to innovation); Richard C. Levin, Appropriability, R&D
Spentng, and Technological Performance, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 427, (1988), (finding that
spillovers of technology between companies may play an important role in rapid technological
progress).
8. See SAXENIAN, supra note 1, at 8-9.
9. See id. at 37.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 34-35.
12. Id. at 35.
13. See id. at 37.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 35. Indeed, "efforts to take legal action against departed employees proved
inconclusive or protracted." Id.
16. See id.
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firms "without the alienation that might be expected with such a high de-
gree of mobility.""'
Indeed, this unique employment mobility contributes to the success
of the Silicon Valley and distinguishes it from other less successful tech-
nology areas. 18 For example, the Route 128 region in the Boston area
(hereinafter "Route 128") had exhibited "technological vitality, entrepre-
neurship and extraordinary economic growth" during the 1970's. 9 By
the end of the 1980's, however, Route 128 lost its dominance in com-
puter production to the Silicon Valley.' Observers believe that Route
128's decline was due to its industrial system which consisted of inde-
pendent self-contained firms, which allowed little interaction between
them."- "Employees in Route 128 firms tended to be loyal to the firm,
and generally expected to stay for the long term, working their way up
the corporate hierarchy and retiring with a comfortable pension."' This
low employment mobility rate was due to the region's culture and geog-
raphy. The culture of the Route 128 region was one in which secrecy
and corporate loyalty governed the relationship between the individual
and the firm.23 The geography of Route 128 contributed to and rein-
forced the independent firm-based industrial system; companies were
"scattered widely along the Route 128 corridor... with miles of forest,
lakes, and highways separating them."24 This geographical and cultural
separation made it difficult for engineers of different firms to exchange
technological information and to change jobs.' These factors resulted in
low employment mobility26 and a corresponding slower adjustment pace
to changes. Accordingly, the "independent firm-based industrial system"
of Route 128 limited the firms' ability to adapt quickly to changing com-
petitive conditions.27 On the other hand, the unique "network-based in-
dustrial system" of the Silicon Valley has accommodated fast changes,
sustaining the region's economic and technological vitality.
17. Id. at 37.
18. See, e.g., id. (comparing the Route 128 region to the Silicon Valley).
19. See id. atl.
20. See id. at 2.
21. See id. at ix-x, 59-82.
22. Id. at 77.
23. See id. at 59.
24. Id. at 60.
25. See id. at 61. On the contrary, the geographic proximity of firms in the Silicon Valley
facilitated occupational mobility. "'People change jobs out here without changing car pools,'"
said one executive. Id.
26. See, e.g., id. at 75. Indeed, Digital Equipment Technology, one of the main players
in the Route 128 region, boasted a turnover rate among the lowest in the computer industry.
See id. at 75.
27. See id. at 9.
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Alarmingly, lawsuits are threatening the Valley's valuable networks.
After two decades of amicable farewells, high technology employers in
the Silicon Valley are replacing their blessings for departing employees
with litigation. Recent high profile cases include the suit filed by Infor-
mix, a database company, which accused the database giant Oracle of
stealing its trade secrets by raiding a team of Informix's key engineers.'
Similarly, chip manufacturer Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD") sued
Hyundai, seeking to prevent former AMD employees now working for
Hyundai from performing certain tasks.29 This phenomenon is likely a
result of the heated pace of competition among Silicon Valley companies,
forcing them to preserve their competitive advantage by protecting their
intellectual property more aggressively."
The current trend of increased litigation may undermine the founda-
tion of the Silicon Valley's success31 by chilling companies from aggres-
sively competing for experienced engineering talent. Furthermore, liti-
gation can be extremely disruptive to a company's business.32 It takes
time, drains resources, and distracts employees and employers from what
they do best-developing new technology.33 Yet, California law clearly
allows competitors to solicit each other's employees except in a few nar-
row circumstances when employers use "unfair or deceptive means" or
engage in "concomitant, unconscionable conduct" to effectuate the hir-
ing.3
4
This Note will address these circumstances, examine the employer's
rights and duties in specific situations, and recommend practices that will
28. See Jodi Mardesich, Battle on Trade Secrets Oracle Sued: Informix Claims Database
Giant Lured Engineers To Get Proprietary Information, SAN JosE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 25,
1997, at 1C.
29. See Anthony Caltado, Hyundai Proceeds, Despite AMD, ELEcTRONIC BuYER's
NEWS, May 13, 1996, at 2.
30. See Pascal W. DiFronzo, When Lips Aren't Sealed, LEGAL TIMES, April 8, 1996, at
46.
31. Caltado, supra note 29 (citing Sam Young, Vice President of Marketing for the Flash
Division at Hyundai Electronics America, Sunnyvale, Cal.).
32. Lawrence F. Carnevale et al., Anti-Compete Pacts Iffy, NAT'L L.J., June 17, 1996, at
D1.
33. See Caltado, supra note 29.
34. Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25-26 (1968) (stating that defendant com-
pany committed no wrong in hiring away its competitor's employees because the interests of the
employee in his own mobility and betterment are deemed paramount to the competitive business
interest of the employers); see also Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d, 573, 577 (1994) ("[Competitors may solicit another's employees if they do not
use unlawful means or engage in acts of unfair competition"); Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley
Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965) (holding that employment contracts which prohibit an
employee from working for a competitor are invalid unless necessary to protect the employer's
trade secrets); Buxbom v. Smith, 145 P.2d. 305, 310 (Cal. 1944) ("[lIt is not ordinarily a tort
to hire the employees of another for use in the hirer's business.").
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help employers avoid and deal effectively with potential lawsuits. Part I
offers an analysis of the causes of action that may arise from certain hir-
ing practices. It provides a summary of California state law governing
the hiring process and, where needed, supplements California law with
the law of the Ninth Circuit, and of other jurisdictions, both state and
federal. Part II provides a hypothetical which represents the typical hir-
ing process in the Silicon Valley. The liability of the parties in the hy-
pothetical is analyzed according to the law discussed in Part I. Part III
proposes guidelines in the recruiting and hiring process in the form of a
check list of recommended practices in order for hiring employers to
avoid liability. Finally, this Note concludes that California courts should
continue the pro-competition tradition.
I. Analysis of Potential Causes of Action
The recent boom in the Silicon Valley has created a problem of une-
qual supply and demand for technical employees.35 Jobs are "going beg-
ging" because there are more jobs than people to fill them.3 6 Thus, "to
protect their competitive edge, employers are increasingly resorting to
lawsuits to prevent valued employees from taking similar jobs with rival
companies." 37 For example, in January of 1997, Informix Software, Inc.
filed a lawsuit against its arch-rival Oracle Corporation and eleven former
Informix employees.38 Informix alleged that Oracle lured away these
eleven engineers "to gain expertise and catch up in the hotly competitive
market for corporate database software." 39  Oracle vehemently denied
this allegation, maintaining that the hiring simply reflected an interest in
attracting good employees.' The employees, also named as defendants
in the lawsuit, called Informix's lawsuit against them an "infringement of
their freedom of choice."41 They explained that they left Informix for
Oracle because they believed that Oracle is a better-managed company
with stronger research and development.42
This case illustrates the potential conflict between the three parties:
the departed employee, his or her former employer, and his or her new
employer. A typical suit begins with the departure of an employee to
35. See Michele Hostetler, Area Rings Up Plethora of Telecom Work, THE BUSINESs
JOURNAL-SAN JOSE, March 25, 1996, at 1.
36. See id.
37. See DiFronzo, supra note 30, at 46.
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further his career interests in the employ of a competitor.43 Fearing pos-
sible disclosure of its technological know-how, loss of the employee's
expertise as well as a subsequent loss of its competitive advantage, the
former employer sues to enjoin the disclosure or use of its trade secrets
or to enjoin the departed employee from assuming his responsibilities in
his new job. ' The most common causes of action advanced by former
employers against their departed employees and the hiring employers in-
clude unfair competition, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of employment
contract, and trade secret misappropriation.45 These causes of action will
be analyzed seriatim in this section.
A. Unfair Competition
Generally, competitors may hire away another's employees if they
do not use unfair or deceptive means, or engage in some concomitant or
unconscionable conduct in the hiring process.46 In unfair competition
cases, it is not the defendant's hiring of plaintiff's employees which is
objectionable; rather, it is the use of improper means to solicit the em-
ployees which is punishable. The California Business and Professions
Code defines unfair competition as an "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice." 4' Courts have broadly construed unfair compe-
tition to include a number of causes of action such as misappropriation of
trade secrets, breach of duty of loyalty, and other unfair practices that do
not give rise to a recognizable cause of action.48 Thus, the unfair com-
petition claim often overlaps other legal theories. Plaintiffs usually ad-
vance the unfair competition claim as a residual cause of action because
this cause of action covers allegations that do not fit within any of the es-
tablished legal principles.49
An example of judicial analysis of an unfair competition claim is
Buxbom v. Smith."0 In that case, the court determined that breaching a
43. See Robert Alan Spanner, Leaving with Secrets, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 11, 1995, at 47.
44. See id. The departed employee sees the suit as an infringement on his right to make a
living, while the new employer views such a suit as anti-competitive litigation. See id.
45. Id.
46. See Metro Traffic Control, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577; Diodes, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26;
Muggill, 398 P.2d at 149; Buxbom, 145 P.2d at 310.
47. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997).
48. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1477 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that
under California law, unfair competition includes anything that can be called a business practice
and is also forbidden by law); see also Courtesy Temp. Servs., Inc. v. Camacho, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 352, 360 (1990) (holding that misappropriation of plaintiff's customer list should be en-
joined as unfair competition even if it did not qualify as a trade secret under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act).
49. See Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1477.
50. 145 P.2d. 305 (Cal. 1944).
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contract to facilitate the hiring of a competitor's employees constituted
unfair competition." The plaintiff in Buxbom was the owner of a busi-
ness engaging in the distribution of fliers, newspapers and advertisers.52
Defendants entered into two contracts with plaintiff under which plaintiff
was to handle the publication and distribution of defendants' newspaper.5 3
Immediately after entering into the contracts with defendants, plaintiff
enlarged his distributing crews, hiring additional supervisors to prepare to
handle the distribution of 40,000 copies of defendants' shopping news. 4
Shortly thereafter, defendants canceled the distribution contract and hired
away plaintiff's distributing crews and supervisors.55 The court held that
defendants were liable not only for breach of contract but also for unfair
competition.56 The court recognized that the defendants gained an unfair
advantage over the plaintiff by deliberately inducing plaintiff to build up
his distributing business, and then, having acquired the knowledge of
plaintiff's business and methods and records through the contractual rela-
tionship, terminating their relationship with plaintiff, and hiring his
crews. 7 Accordingly, breaching a contract to facilitate raiding a com-
petitor's employees is an example of unfair competition.
Another commonly claimed unfair practice is predatory hiring: hir-
ing away a competitor's employee solely to destroy its business.5" "In
such a case, the defendant does not seek the services of gifted or skilled
employees as such, but aims to cripple, destroy or misappropriate a com-
petitor's business organization." 9 Because predatory hiring is rooted in
both antitrust law and common law, plaintiffs have advanced this type of
claim under both theories. Under antitrust theory, 6° a plaintiff claiming
predatory hiring must establish three elements: (1) defendant has a mo-
nopoly power in the relevant market; (2) defendant hired away its com-
petitor's employees for the sole purpose of denying them to a competitor;
and (3) defendant's actions resulted in causal antitrust injury. 61  The
Ninth Circuit has strictly construed the "sole purpose" element; as long
as the employer does not hire the competitor's employees for the sole
purpose of destroying the competitor, it will not be held liable for preda-
51. See id. at 310-11.




56. See id. at 311.
57. See id.
58. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1258
(9th Cir. 1990).
59. 2 RUDOLPH CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 9.03 at 141 (Louis Altman ed., 4th ed. 1996) (citation omitted).
60. See Universal Analytics, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1257.
61. See id. at 1258.
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tory hiring.62 Thus, even if one of the company's purposes for hiring its
competitor's employees is to injure the competitor's business, the com-
pany has committed no wrong.
63
The Ninth Circuit thoroughly analyzed a predatory hiring claim un-
der antitrust theory in Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler
Corp.' In that case, defendant hired five of plaintiff's six key technical
employees. To support its claim, plaintiff introduced a memo from de-
fendant's executive vice president, which read:
This guy came through some months ago, and we turned him down be-
cause he didn't give us a warm feeling.... Since then, Nima B. [a
prior employee of plaintiff] has given him a strong endorsement. As
Nima is a winner, this is important. Also we wound UAI [plaintiff]
again, and Layfield has shown that he is hard-nosed enough to fire
someone who does not work out. 65
The court held that the four words "we wound UAI again" were in-
sufficient to establish predatory intent; although one reason for the hiring
was to frustrate the competitor, defendant's primary motivation was to
obtain a productive employee for itself.' The court also stated that evi-
dence that the new employee is put to use in his new job can exonerate
the hiring employer of a predatory hiring claim.67 Thus, a predatory
claim based on antitrust law is very difficult to establish because a plain-
tiff has to show not only that defendant has monopoly power, but also
that defendant attempts to gain or maintain that illegitimate power by
hiring away plaintiff's employees.6"
Similar to antitrust law, a plaintiff claiming predatory hiring under
common law must show that the sole purpose for defendant's hiring away
plaintiff's employees is to cripple plaintiff's business.69
62. See id. at 1258-59; cf. Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries, Inc., 576
F.2d 83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring plaintiff who advances a predatory claim under anti-
trust law to show adverse impact on the market in addition to showing that defendant used un-
fair means).
63. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d 1259.
64. See id.
65. Id. (emphasis in original).
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1257.
69. See Gunter v. Astor, 4 J.B. Moore, 12 (1819) (defendant ruined plaintiff's business by
enticing plaintiff's employees by entertaining them lavishly and offering them higher wages);
Sugar Creek Creamery Co. v. Momence Milk Coop. Ass'n, 37 Trademark Rep. 851 (E.D. Ill.
1947) (defendant sought to deprive plaintiff of his key employees, contractors and buyers);
Driver v. Smith, 89 N.J. Eq. 339, (N.J. 1918) (defendant enticed plaintiff's employees to leave
with the intention to drive plaintiff out of business); International Tailoring Co. of N.Y., Inc.
v. Lukas, 64 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (defendant induced employees of plaintiff to breach
their employment contract and work for defendant).
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Under both antitrust and common law theories, the means used in
the hiring process can provide circumstantial evidence of a predatory
purpose.7" Wrongful means include targeting recruiting efforts exclu-
sively at a particular competitor" or enticing a competitor's employees by
offering unwarranted significant monetary rewards.' Courts may view
targeting the recruiting efforts exclusively at one competitor as an attempt
to raid the competitor's employees to drive the competitor out of busi-
ness. However, evidence that an employment agency placed the em-
ployee, without a direction from the hiring employer to recruit exclu-
sively from one source, can negate this charge. 3  For example, the
Universal Analytics court noted that the employees were not sought out
by the defendant company, but rather placed at the defendant company by
employment agencies, and refused to find defendant liable for predatory
hiring.74 The district court below also dismissed plaintiff's allegation that
defendant conspired with the employment agencies to deplete plaintiff's
crucial talent, because defendant did not direct the agencies to seek em-
ployees from any particular source or to target certain employees of
plaintiff.75 Accordingly, evidence that the hiring employer used different
venues to obtain employees can exculpate the hiring employer from a
predatory hiring charge.76
Some federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, as well as some
state courts outside California, have held that, like targeted recruiting,
significant monetary rewards disproportionate to the new employee's
skills and experience are evidence of predatory hiring.' One state court
in North Carolina noted that an offer to pay a new employee's legal ex-
penses in defending a potential action by the former employer was evi-
dence that helped to establish wrongful intent.7' On the other hand, the
70. See Medtronic Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1467 (D. Minn.
1990)(offering excessive compensation to employees); United Lab., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 370
S.E.2d 375, 387-88 (N.C. 1988) (paying employee's legal costs); Universal Analytics, 914
F.2d at 1259 (directing employment agency to raid employees of competitor).
71. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d at 1259.
72. See Medtronic Inc., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
73. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1170,
1174 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd 914 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990).
74. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d at 1259.
75. See Universal Analytics, 707 F. Supp. at 1174-76.
76. Id.
77. Medtronics Inc., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467 (offering salaries designed not as rea-
sonable compensation but intended to harm or destroy plaintiff constitutes an actionable claim);
United Lab., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d 375 (N.C. 1988), aff'd 437 S.E.2d 374 (N.C.
1993).
78. See Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d at 387-88. In that case, one of plaintiff's sales represen-
tatives went to work as a sales representative of a competitor. See id. at 377-378. In his new
job, the sales representative solicited the same customers he had called on while employed by
plaintiff. See id. at 387. The competitor, aware that a non-competition covenant existed be-
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Ninth Circuit found that a salary increase of less than 20% was commen-
surate with the employees' specialized programming skills, such that the
increase was not evidence of predatory hiring intent.79 Thus, evidence
that the hiring employer "bought" the employees of its competitor may be
used to infer a predatory hiring intent.
Although California state courts have not addressed these types of
wrongful conduct, they likely would adopt the rules articulated by the
Ninth Circuit and the other federal and state courts when evaluating
claims under both antitrust law and common law, because these rules are
consistent with a pro-competition policy. For example, the courts' "sole
purpose" requirement furthers California's interest in allowing competi-
tors to solicit each other's employees.80 The sole purpose requirement is
sensible for several reasons. It permits the hiring of a competitor's em-
ployees even if such hiring results in economic injury to the competitor.
When an employee leaves, the former employer must expend resources
to find and train a replacement. Thus, without the "sole purpose" re-
quirement, employers could never hire experienced employees because
doing so would undoubtedly injure the employees' prior employers. In
addition to articulating the "sole purpose" test, the Universal Analytics
court identified evidence that could be used to defeat a predatory hiring
charge, such as whether the employee is put to use." Because employees
usually change jobs to seek career advancement, they would not accept
new jobs where their knowledge, skills and experience are not put to
use.' 2 Thus, employees' interests in their own mobility and betterment,
together with market forces, ensure efficient utilization of employees.
tween plaintiff and the sales representative, agreed to pay any legal costs the sales representative
would incur in breaching the covenants. See id. at 387-88. The court stated that the competi-
tor's agreement to pay for legal fees might lend support to the proposition that the competitor
hired the representative for a wrongful purpose. See id. at 388.
79. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d at 1259.
80. See Metro Traffic Control Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577
(Ct. App. 1994) ("Competitors may solicit another's employees if they do not use unlawful
means or engage in acts of unfair competition."); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 26
(Ct. App. 1968) (a company commits no wrong in hiring away its competitor's employees be-
cause "[tlhe interests of the employee in his own mobility and betterment are deemed para-
mount to the competitive business interests of the employers"); Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelly
Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965) (employment contracts which prohibit an employee from
working for a competitor are invalid "unless they are necessary to protect the employer's trade
secrets"); Buxbom v. Smith, 145 P.2d 305, 310 (Cal. 1944) ("It is ordinarily a tort to hire the
employees of another for use in the hirer's business.")
81. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text (discussing targeted recruiting and un-
reasonably high job offers).
82. One can argue that the employees would accept such a job if they are paid a significant
amount of money. However, "buying" employees to drive their prior employer out of business
also violates the law. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing unreasonably
high level of compensation).
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Furthermore, determining whether an employee is used effectively or ef-
ficiently would force the court to second-guess the employer's business
decision. Because the sole purpose rule makes sense, California courts
should require a plaintiff claiming predatory hiring under either antitrust
law or common law to prove that a defendant has no interest in using the
employees' talents, and that, instead, defendant's sole purpose in hiring
away plaintiff's employees is to destroy plaintiff's business.
Accordingly, competitors may hire away another's employees if they
do not use in the hiring process such unfair means as targeted recruiting
or offering excessive monetary rewards for the sole purpose of driving
their competitors out of business.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Because the employees' conduct may implicate the employer in
wrongdoing, the employer must understand what types of conduct are
considered unacceptable.
Corporate officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to their em-
ployer.83 Non-officer employees may have similar duties of loyalty to
their employer under the principles of agency law. ' Thus, it is unac-
ceptable for a departing employee to transfer his loyalty to a new em-
ployer while still employed by his current employer.8"
The mere fact that an employee or officer makes preparations to
compete against his current employer before resigning is insufficient to
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. 6 On the other hand, helping one's
new employer to recruit one's co-workers by supplying their salary in-
formation to the new employer would constitute a breach. 7 In Bancroft-
Whitney Co. v. Glen, Glen, the president of Bancroft-Whitney, accepted
an offer of employment from Bender, a rival company. 8 Before leaving
his employment with Bancroft-Whitney, Glen approached a number of
Bancroft-Whitney's employees about accepting employment also with
Bender. 9 He revealed their names and salaries to Bender and caused
83. See Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 934-35 (Cal. 1966).
84. See Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Equities, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 798 n.21 (Ct. App.
1990). "[Ain agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the prin-
cipal .... " Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-39). No California case
has expressly recognized such fiduciary duties for non-officer employees.
85. See Fowler v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 (Ct. App. 1987).
86. See Bancroft-Whitney, 411 P.2d at 936; Fowler, 539 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
87. The California Supreme Court has held that "salaries paid by a corporation to its em-
ployees are not matters of common knowledge.. ." and may not be revealed to a competitor to
facilitate the recruitment of the corporation's personnel. See Bancroft-Whitney, 411 P.2d at
939.
88. See id. at 924, 927.
89. See id. at 928.
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Bancroft-Whitney to delay giving raises to its employees so that Bender
could offer these employees higher salaries." Ultimately, Glen managed
to recruit 13 employees to leave Bancroft-Whitney simultaneously and
accept employment with Bender.9 The California Supreme Court held
that Glen had breached his fiduciary duty to Bancroft-Whitney because he
used his position as the president, and information to which he was privy
due to his position, to facilitate the solicitation of Bancroft-Whitney's
employees.' Moreover, the court found Bender guilty of unfair compe-
tition because it participated in and reaped the benefit of Glen's action. 3
Accordingly, helping one's prospective employer to exploit one's current
employer can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
Although a non-officer employee may be held to a lesser fiduciary
standard, he still owes his prior employer a fiduciary duty.' Participat-
ing in one employer's operation while still employed by another employer
constitutes a wrongful transfer of loyalty.' In Fowler v. Varian, the
court held that the departing manager breached his duty of loyalty be-
cause he discussed the possibility of joining a new company with the new
company's founders; offered ideas and suggestions about the new com-
pany's business; discussed the capital structure of the new company; dis-
cussed the new company's product, which would compete directly with
his current employer's product; attended meetings with investors and as-
sured them that he would join the new company; and when confronted by
the employer, would not reveal his association with the new company.96
The court seemed to be concerned with the departing employee's heavy
participation in his prospective employer's business as well as his decep-
tion of his current employer.' Accordingly, under Fowler, it is a breach
of fiduciary duty for employees to participate in their new employers' op-
erations and for officer-employees to help their new employers recruit
their current co-workers before they resign from their current employ-
ment.
90. See id. at 936-41.
91. See id. at 926-33.
92. Id. at 936-37.
93. See id. at 939-41.
94. See Balboa Ins. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 798 n.21 (suggesting that a fiduciary duty may
exist under the agency doctrine).
95. See Fowler v. Varian Assos., 241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 (Ct. App. 1987).
96. See id. at 540-44.
97. See id. at 543-44.
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C. Trade Secret Misappropriation 8
As a result of technical advances and greater employment mobility,
trade secret misappropriation has grown more important in the employ-
ment arena. In the Silicon Valley, the importance of trade secret law is
magnified because intellectual properties are among the most valuable as-
sets to Silicon Valley companies.' As competition becomes more heated
in the Silicon Valley, businesses have become more concerned with the
prospect of losing their intellectual properties via departing employees."tu
Thus, to maintain their competitive edge, Silicon Valley firms have in-
creasingly resorted to the legal protection of their intellectual properties
under trade secret law.101 Despite its proliferation, the trade secret mis-
appropriation claim remains burdensome for a plaintiff to establish. Even
if plaintiff has shown that the alleged misappropriated information quali-
fies as a trade secret,"° plaintiff has only won half the battle. To suc-
cessfully establish a trade secret claim, plaintiff must also prove that the
information: (1) derives independent economic value from not being gen-
erally known; (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy; and that (3) the employee used
improper means to misappropriate the trade secrets.'
In the employment arena, trade secret law prohibits employees from
disclosing or using the trade secrets learned during their employment. 5
Where an employee changes jobs, the new employer may be liable to the
prior employer if it knows or has reason to know that the new employee
is using or disclosing his prior employer's trade secrets and stands to
98. The California Civil Code defines "trade secret" as:
[1Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being gen-
erally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use; and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to main-
tain its secrecy.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1997).
While this Note offers some guidelines regarding the types of information not qualified as
trade secrets, it does not offer an analysis of the statutory language defining trade secrets.
Thus, whether the information derives independent economic value and is guarded as a secret is
beyond the scope of this Note.
99. See DiFronzo, supra note 30.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See § 3426.1(d).
103. See § 3426.1.
104. See id.
105. See § 3426 (prohibiting misappropriation of trade secrets).
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benefit from such use or disclosure."6 The courts impose a duty on the
employer to inquire into the employee's conduct to determine whether the
employee is using his prior employer's trade secrets in certain circum-
stances.
(1) Duty to inquire
An employer has a duty to inquire once it acquires constructive or
actual knowledge that its new employee is using trade secrets of the pre-
vious employer."t An employer has "constructive notice," under the
California Civil Code, when the employer has "actual notice of circum-
stances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular
fact, [which] constitutes constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases
in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, one might have learned such
fact.". 8 After an honest inquiry to determine if the new employee is in a
position to disclose the former employer's trade secrets, an employer
may reasonably rely upon the result of his investigation." Whether reli-
ance is reasonable depends on the employer's experience, intelligence,
and business environment."1
Ralph Andrews Productions, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp. of-
fersa valuable analysis of the scope of an employer's duty to inquire."'
The plaintiffs in that case, Ralph Andrews Productions, Inc. ("RAP")
and Ralph Andrews, were established producers of television game
shows.' Bernstein, a vice president of RAP, was in charge of develop-
ing new concepts for television shows."' After RAP had developed a
game show titled "Anything For Money," Andrews suggested that Bern-
stein present the idea of this game show to Paramount. 14 Rather than
presenting the idea on behalf of RAP, Bernstein told Paramount that he
had ownership rights to the show. 5 Paramount then hired Bernstein to
106. See § 3426.1(b)(2); Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr.
268, 271 (Ct. App. 1961) (disapproved on another point, Nichols v. Hast, 400 P.2d 753 (Cal.
1965)) (enjoining defendants from manufacturing heating units by utilizing plaintiff's trade se-
crets misappropriated by plaintiffs former employee now working for defendant).
107. Ralph Andrews Prods., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 271 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800
(Ct. App. 1990).
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 19 (West 1982).
109. See Ralph Andrews Prods., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
110. See id. at 801-802; Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 192 P.2d 935, 937-38 (Cal. 1948)
(plaintiffs reliance on defendant's misrepresentation was reasonable because plaintiff was not a
vineyardist and knew nothing about growing grapes).
111. See 271 Cal. Rptr. at 799-802.
112. See id. at 798.
113. See id. at 797-98.
114. See id. at 798.
115. See id.
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produce the show, knowing that Bernstein had worked for RAP."1 6 The
court held Paramount liable for trade secret misappropriation because it
had constructive notice that the game show belonged to RAP rather than
to Bernstein."1 7 The court noted that although Paramount asked Bernstein
for a letter verifying the ownership of the right, Paramount failed to fol-
low up with this request when Bernstein did not produce the verifica-
tion. "8 The court believed that further inquiry by Paramount would have
revealed that the concept belonged to RAP."19 The court held that Para-
mount was not entitled to rely on Bernstein's misrepresentation because
the Paramount representative who dealt with Bernstein was an experi-
enced and sophisticated executive in this type of business transaction.12
Thus, as Ralph Andrews Productions reveals, employers have a duty to
monitor their new employees to ensure that the employees are not using
trade secrets of their prior employer.
(2) General concepts
Because not all proprietary information qualifies as a trade secret,
12 1
an employer should preliminarily evaluate the information the new em-
ployee brings to his new job to identify unprotectable information so that
the employer may immediately take advantage of its competitor's unpro-
tectable information. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has declared that
ultimate goals and general concepts do not constitute trade secrets. Gen-
eral concepts cannot be claimed as an employer's trade secrets because
they.are "general... principles in the public domain and part of the in-
tellectual equipment of technical employees. " 2 In Winston Research
Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. after the research phase for a
new precision tape producer, Johnson left Mincom's employment.2
Fourteen months later, at his new employment, Johnson completed a ma-
chine having the same desirable characteristics as the Mincom ma-
chine.'24 The court held that the general approach to the technical con-
cept in question did not qualify as a trade secret because it "was dictated
by well-known principles of physics. "" However, the device's specifi-
cations of the basic mechanical elements and their relationship to each
116. See id. at 799.
117. See id. at 799-802.
118. See id. at 799.
119. See id. at 800-01.
120. See id. at 801-02.
121. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1997).
122. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 139
(9th Cir. 1965).
123. See id. at 137.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 139.
TO HIRE OR NOT TO HIREJuly M1]
other were trade secrets because they were not publicly known, and Min-
corn discovered these concepts after painstaking research and extensive
trial and error. 2 6
Thus, concepts consisting of general principles such as programming
principles do not qualify as trade secrets.' 27
(3) Knowledge, skills and expertise
Similarly, courts generally refuse to extend trade secret protection to
the knowledge, skills and expertise of an employee."2 The leading Cali-
fornia case on this topic is Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic
Network. 129 The defecting employees in this case were initially reporters
and producers for Metro Traffic Control, a company that contracted with
radio stations to gather and broadcast local traffic information.'" When
the radio station KFWB, an important customer of Metro, did not renew
its contract, the employees left Metro and went to work for Shadow Traf-
fic Network."' Metro sued Shadow for trade secret misappropriation,
alleging that the employees' qualities, sound, and personalities, as well as
their knowledge of the likes, fancies and characteristics of KFWB, were
Metro's trade secrets. 32  The court disagreed and held the employees
only took their knowledge and talents, which they could use as they
pleased.13  Accordingly, Metro Traffic Control reveals that an em-
ployee's talent, knowledge, skills and experience are not trade secrets
belonging to his employer.
134
Similarly, expertise developed by applying one's knowledge and in-
telligence is not a trade secret.' Although an employee may have begun
126. See id.
127. See id.; see also SCM v. Union Camp Corp., 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 140, 144 (D. Fla.
1970) (holding that defendant's use of plaintiff's five-step process to produce myrcene did not
constitute misappropriation of trade secrets because the process was well known in the industry,
and defendant's method of practicing the five well-known steps at his new company was sub-
stantially different from that of plaintiff).
128. See Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573,
578-79 (Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that "a stable of trained and talented at-will employees does
not constitute an employer's trade secret").
129. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (Ct. App. 1994).
130. Id. at 574-75.
131. Id. at 577
132. Id. at 578-79.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See e.g., King v. Pacific Vitamin Corp., 64 Cal. Rptr. 486, 489 (Ct. App. 1967)
(stating that enhancements in an employee's general knowledge and experience are not trade
secrets no matter how extensive); Vekamaf Holland B.V. v. Pipe Benders, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 955, 984 (D. Minn. 1981), aft'd, 696 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1982) (explaining that
.experience was not a trade secret").
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as an inexperienced worker, the knowledge and skills he gains by work-
ing and training in his employer's business belong to him. 3 6 Confidential
information of an employer loses protection after it has been merged into
the employee's "own faculties, skill and experience."' 37 Thus, a junior
engineer trained at the expense of his employer and who, after having ac-
quired valuable general knowledge of the trade, leaves the employer and
goes to work for a competitor, commits no wrong.' Accordingly, most
jurisdictions have determined that an employee is free to draw upon his
general knowledge, experience, memory and skills upon termination of
employment. 1
39
(4) Inevitable disclosure theory
Although the majority of courts do not view employees' knowledge,
experience and skills as the employers' trade secrets, a minority of courts
outside California, and outside the Ninth Circuit, have held that, under
certain circumstances, information that has been merged into the em-
ployee's "own faculties, skills and experience" can be deemed a trade se-
cret. ' ° This minority rule is based on the "inevitable disclosure" the-
136. Ridley v. Krout, 180 P.2d 124, 130 (Wyo. 1947) (explaining that knowledge acquired
by an employee in his employer's shop where the employee performed lock work of all sorts,
including key making, opening of safes, and changing lock combinations, did not constitute
trade secrets of his employer); Welex Jet Services, Inc. v. Owen, 325 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1959) (stating that employees need not forgo the exercise of their inventive powers
even when inspired by knowledge and experience gained during previous employment).
137. Aronson v. Orlov, 116 N.E. 951, 953 (Mass. 1917).
138. See Official Aviation Guide Co., Inc. v. American Aviation Assocs., 150 F.2d 173,
178 (7th Cir. 1945) (holding that an employer cannot prevent its employee from using skill and
intelligence acquired through the course of employment even if the employee uses the skills and
intelligence for the benefit of the employer's rival); Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 160 N.E.
804, 806 (Mass. 1928) (explaining that a previous employer cannot contractually prevent an
employee from using skill and intelligence acquired or increased during employment).
139. See e.g., GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 771 (S.D. Ohio 1969) (holding
that defendants "had every right" to utilize their general knowledge and experience upon termi-
nation of their employment"). An employee often gains information during an earlier job
which enables the employee to succeed in subsequent employment. Thus, courts cannot compel
employees who change employment to "wipe clean the slate of their memories." Moss, Adams
& Co. v. Shilling, 224 Cal. Rptr. 456, 458-59 (Ct. App. 1986); Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary
Corp., 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 210 (Ct. App. 1962).
In practice, however, the trade secret jurisprudence falls to provide a guideline for em-
ployers and employees to distinguish meaningfully between an employee's education, skill and
experience, and the employer's protectable trade secrets. See Spanner, supra note 43, at 47
(characterizing this area of litigation as a "roll of the dice"). As a result, the issue of whether
certain information constitutes an employee's knowledge and skill-or an employer's protect-
able trade secrets-seems to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
140. See e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995) (relying on
the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine and enjoining a marketing executive from performing a
similar function for a competitor); Carborundum Co. v. Williams, 468 F. Supp. 38, 41-42
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ory.14' The premise of this theory is that there are rare circumstances
where it would be impossible for a key employee to accept a particular
position with a competitor and faithfully perform his or her new duties
without necessarily calling upon trade secrets learned by virtue of the
prior employment. 42
Silicon Valley employers who have lost employees to rival firms
have advanced the inevitable disclosure theory in the California courts. 43
Indeed, the Superior Court of Santa Clara County in Advanced Micro
Devices v. Hyundai Electronics America,' is expected to determine
whether the inevitable disclosure theory conforms to California law.
Therefore, it is important for prospective employers to recognize and un-
derstand this potential liability if the California courts choose to adopt the
inevitable disclosure theory.
The modem seminal case of the inevitable disclosure theory is the
Seventh Circuit case of PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond. 45 In PepsiCo,
Redmond, the general manager of the California operations of PepsiCo,
accepted an offer to become a vice president of the beverage division of
Quaker Oats Company.146 Due to his position at PepsiCo, Redmond had
an intimate knowledge of PepsiCo's strategic marketing information for
its "All Sport" sports drink.147 One of Redmond's first responsibilities at
Quaker Oats Company was to integrate the distribution of Quaker's
"Gatorade" sports drink with its "Snapple" beverage product line.1
48
PepsiCo sued Redmond and Quaker to enjoin Redmond from assuming
his duties at Quaker and to prevent him from using PepsiCo's marketing
information for "All Sports." 49 The court of appeals upheld the order
(E.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd, 590 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1978) (mem.) (relying on the "inevitable dis-
closure" doctrine and granting preliminary injunction forbidding former employee from di-
vulging to his new employer any information learned while working for plaintiff); Weed Eater,
Inc. v. Dowling, 562 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (relying on the "inevitable disclo-
sure" doctrine, upholding one-year injunction against employee thereby preventing him from
working for Plaintiff's competitor); Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 1059-60 (N.Y.
1978) (relying on the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine and reversing a summary dismissal of
complaint against the employee because disclosure of the former employer's trade secrets by the
employee was highly probable).
141. PepsiCo, Inc. 54 F.3d at 1268-69.
142. Such information is often so ingrained in the employee's memory that it cannot be un-
learned or ignored by even the most ethical employee engaged in directly competitive employ-
ment.
143. See Luan v. Superior Ct., No. S053879 (S.J. App. 1996) (leaving in place a prelimi-
nary injunction, thus precluding five engineers from assuming new positions); Cataldo, supra
note 29 (reporting the status of Advance Micro Devices v. Hyundai Electronics America).
144. Cataldo, supra note 29.
145. 54 F.3d 1262.
146. Id. at 1264.
147. Id. at 1265-66.
148. Id. at 1266.
149. Id. at 1265.
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that enjoined Redmond from assuming his new position at Quaker for six
months. 150  The court reasoned that Redmond, in his new position at
Quaker, would not be able to refrain from relying on PepsiCo's trade se-
crets as he planned the new distribution strategy for Gatorade and Snap-
pie. The court explained:
PepsiCo finds itself in the position of a coach, one of whose players has
left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the big game.
Quaker and Redmond's protestation that their distribution systems and
plans are entirely different from [PepsiCo's ] are thus not really respon-
sive.'
5'
However, PepsiCo and the inevitable disclosure theory are problem-
atic. In granting the injunction, the district court in PepsiCo had relied
on IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., a case that was later vacated on
remand.' Moreover, the inevitable disclosure doctrine is actually a dis-
guised non-competition covenant, which is unenforceable in California.1
53
First, in preventing an employee from assuming a position with another
employer which will require the employee, intentionally or otherwise, to
call upon his or her previously acquired knowledge, this doctrine prohib-
its a former employee not only from disclosing secrets but also from tak-
ing certain jobs.'54 Indeed, in FMC Corp., a district court in North
Carolina recently rejected the inevitable disclosure theory because such a
law would effectively make the employee an "indentured servant" of his
prior employer.5 Prohibiting an employee from accepting comparable
employment is beyond the scope of trade secret law.
Furthermore, California law only prohibits misappropriation of trade
secrets and does not prohibit accepting similar responsibilities with a new
employee.'56 Unlike other states, California specifically prohibits cove-
nants not to compete.' 57 Thus, an employee is free to accept an identical
job with a competitor. Furthermore, California requires a plaintiff in a
trade secret misappropriation suit to identify the information allegedly
stolen. 51 Consequently, the court may enjoin an employee from disclos-
ing identified items, instead of enjoining the employee from taking the
job to prevent trade secret misappropriation.
150. Id. at 1272.
151. Id. at 1270.
152. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20406, *1, *7 (D. Minn. 1991), vacated Seagate Tech., Inc.
v. IBM Corp., 962 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1992).
153. James A. DiBoise & David J. Berger, COMPETING VIEWS REGARDING THE
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE OF TRADE SECRETS, NEW MATrER, Spring 1996, at 44.
154. Id.
155. FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1482 (W.D. N.C.
1995).
156. DiBoise & Berger, supra note 153,at 44.
157. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997).
158. See CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 2019(d) (West 1997).
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The inevitable disclosure doctrine, therefore, seems inconsistent
with California law because it authorizes enjoining the employee from as-
suming the job for which he was hired. Given California's strong public
policy in protecting competition, it is unlikely that the California courts
will adopt the inevitable disclosure theory. Nevertheless, companies that
hire employees from a direct competitor, and then assign them to a proj-
ect that is identical to one that they worked on for their prior employer,
should be aware of the potential liability if the California courts choose to
adopt the inevitable disclosure theory.
(5) Breach Of Employment Contract
In addition to breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade
secrets, an employee's breach of employment contract with his prior em-
ployer can also implicate his new employer.1 9  A typical employment
contract may contain four types of restrictions: (1) a restriction against
soliciting other employees ("non-solicitation"); (2) a restriction against
disclosing proprietary information ("non-disclosure"); (3) a restriction
against competing with the employer ("non-competition"); and (4) a re-
striction against using an invention conceived during employment ("in-
vention assignment").
A non-solicitation provision precludes an employee from soliciting
the departure of her co-workers when she leaves to join another com-
pany. A California court upheld such a provision in an employee's
termination agreement that restrained the employee from "disrupting,
damaging, impairing or interfering" with his former employer by "raid-
ing" its work-staff after termination.' In Loral, the defendant Moyes
resigned from his position as the president of a subsidiary of Loral and
accepted an offer from a competitor, Aydin."6 Moyes' termination was
159. No California court has addressed whether a company has a duty to inquire whether
the employee is under a valid contractual relationship with his prior employer, or to monitor the
employee's activities for wrongful conduct. However, common sense dictates that without a
duty to inquire, employers will deliberately choose to remain ignorant and to claim an innocent
lack of knowledge in the event of a lawsuit. Furthermore, under trade secrets law, the courts
impose a duty on the employer to inquire into the employee's conduct if the employer has con-
structive notice that the employee may be misappropriating his employer's trade secrets. Ralph
Andrews Prods., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 271 Cal. Rptr. 797, 799-800 (Ct. App.
1990). Given the overlap between trade secrets law and contract law in the employment con-
text, the courts will most likely follow the trade secrets rule and will impose a duty of reason-
able inquiry. Accordingly, it is a good practice for the employer to review the new hiree's pre-
vious employment and other agreements with the prior employer to determine the restrictions
imposed on the employee's future conduct.
160. See Loral Corp., 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (explaining the nature of non-solicitation
clauses).
161. Id. at 839-40.
162. Id.
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accompanied by an agreement under which he agreed not to "raid" Lo-
ral's employees. 163 Once at Aydin, however, Moyes recruited a large
number of employees from Loral.'6
Although the court held that the non-solicitation agreement was en-
forceable, it construed the agreement narrowly as prohibiting only af-
firmative solicitation of employees by a former employee.'6 The court
reasoned that the agreement did not significantly restrain trade or busi-
ness because employees were still free to seek employment with the com-
petitor; they only lost the option of being contacted by the departed em-
ployee.' 6 Thus, the Loral court seemed to draw the line between
protected and unprotected competition on a factual question-who calls
whom first regarding the job opportunity.
Accordingly, if the employee had signed a non-solicitation agree-
ment with the prior employer, the new company should require the em-
ployee to refrain from actively recruiting his former employer's person-
nel until the contract expires. Nevertheless, according to the Loral court,
the company is free to talk to those employees who approach the com-
pany on their own initiative. It may be a sound practice for the company
to have any job-seekers sign a declaration stating that they were not en-
listed by the departed employees, and that they themselves initiated the
contact.
Non-disclosure provisions, on the other hand, prohibit employees
from disclosing proprietary information to outsiders, including, but not
limited to, trade secrets. 67 Non-disclosure agreements, however, do not,
in practice, extend the scope of protection beyond trade secrets. They
only protect what is already protected under existing trade secret law.1
68
Thus, if the new employee signed a non-disclosure agreement with his
prior employer, the hiring employer should only be concerned about dis-
closure of trade secrets.
The most restrictive contractual provision is the non-competition
agreement. A non-competition agreement prohibits an employee from
competing with his former employer or imposes penalties for such unau-
thorized competition.169 Non-competition agreements are unenforceable
in California unless drafted narrowly to protect trade secrets or other
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 279-80.
166. Id. at 279.
167. See, e.g., Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
573, 577 (Ct. App. 1994).
168. Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 224 Cal. Rptr. 456, 459 (Ct. App. 1986).
169. See Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965).
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protectable confidential information. 70 Non-competition agreements in-
clude all contracts designed to penalize the employee for accepting em-
ployment with a competitor.' 7 1 In Chamberlain v. Augustine, the Court
declared invalid an agreement requiring the employee to pay liquidated
damages of $5,000 if the employee worked for a competitor.' The
Court reasoned that because of the liability, the employee was "not as
free" to choose employers as he would have been without the agree-
ment.173 Accordingly, non-competition agreements are unenforceable in
California because they restrain the employee's freedom in choosing em-
ployment.
In addition to the above agreements, technical employees are rou-
tinely required to sign an invention assignment agreement. This type of
agreement requires the employee to disclose and assign any contributions
and inventions relating to the employer's business conceived or made
during the employment period to the employer. 74 Such contractual as-
signments of inventions are subject to certain statutory restrictions."5
Notwithstanding this restriction, invention assignment agreements expand
the employer's proprietary rights beyond what is afforded under existing
170. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 ("[e]very contract by which anyone is re-
strained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is to that extent
void."); Muggill, 398 P.2d at 149 (invalidating the provision that forfeited plaintiff's pension
rights if he worked for a competitor).
171. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600.
172. 172 Cal. 285, 288-89 (1916).
173. Id.
174. A typical invention assignment agreement reads as follows:
This agreement concerns contributions and inventions conceived or made by me,
alone or with others
A. while I am employed by the company whether or not during working hours
and
B. that relate to the business of the company or to any reasonable expansion of
such business, or result from my work for the company.
I agree:
1. To disclose them promptly in writing to the company.
2. That all such contributions and inventions are to become the property of the
company whether or not patent applications are filed thereon.
The California Labor Code section 2870(a) prohibits an employer from requiring an employee
to assign rights to inventions that are unrelated to employment. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870(a)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1997). Thus, an employer cannot require an employee to assign any of the
employee's rights in an invention that the employee develops entirely on his own time, without
using the employer's equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret information. Id.
175. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870 (requiring a prior employer looking to claim ownership of an
invention under an assignment contract to establish that the invention relates to the employer's
business or demonstrable anticipated research or development, or results from any work per-
formed by the employee for the employer).
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patent and trade secret laws. 76 Thus, departing technical employees and
hiring employers must pay additional attention to the restrictions imposed
by these assignment agreements, because even inventions that were
merely conceived during prior employment could belong to that former
employer.
Like all contracts, an invention assignment agreement must be sup-
ported by consideration.1" Condition of employment is one common way
to satisfy this consideration requirement. 78  Thus, an invention assign-
ment agreement is enforceable if signed on the first day of employ-
ment. 79 However, if signed during mid-employment, the provision must
be supported by new consideration. 18
Many agreements also include a "trailer clause," requiring the em-
ployee to assign any invention he creates during a period following the
termination of the employment relationship. Most courts limit the scope
of trailer clauses to cover only trade secrets and other protectable pro-
prietary information."' Some courts, however, have extended the cover-
176. See American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
177. See Voith Hydro, Inc. v. Hydro West Group, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3817 at
*14 (N.D. Cal. 1997); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Wise, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9950 at
*6 (E.D. Vir. 1989); cf. National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 404 F.2d 225, 227 (4th
Cir. 1968) (inferring consideration is a requisite for validity and enforcement of a restrictive
covenant).
178. See Nat'l Risk Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417, 429 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (stating that employment itself is a valid consideration for restrictive covenants entailed in
an employment agreement entered into on the first day of work); Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185
Cal. App. 3d 438, 448 (1986).
179. See Nat'l Risk Management, Inc., 819 F. Supp. at 429.
180. Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1339 (9th Cir.
1980) (explaining that when a restrictive covenant is made after employment has started, the
court requires a change in employment status to serve as consideration); Schlumberger Well
Services v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (holding that payment of
$98,750 upon termination was not sufficient as consideration for enforcement of a covenant not
to compete); Gagliardi Bros., Inc. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating
that covenant not to compete was unenforceable for lack of consideration when the employee
received no benefit); Perthou v. Stewart, 243 F. Supp. 655, 658-59 (D. Or. 1965) (finding that
covenant made seven days after the commencement of work was not supported by considera-
tion). But see Modem Controls, Inc. v. Andreakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir. 1978)
(finding that consideration was provided by Modem Control's obligation to pay Andreakis' base
pay for two years if he could not find suitable work in another field); Olin Water Servs. v.
Midland Research Lab., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 412, 415 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (finding that continued
employment was sufficient consideration to support covenant not to compete); Barnes Group v.
Andrealds, 591 F. Supp. 454, 461 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (holding that a promise to pay employee
two years worth of wages if employee could not find suitable work in another field was ade-
quate consideration).
181. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 893 (N.J. 1988); Winston Re-
search Corp. v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1965) (stating that
there is no "judicial recognition of a legally protectible [sic] interest in the secrecy of industrial
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age of the trailer clause to "highly specialized, current information not
generally known in the industry, created and stimulated by the research
environment furnished by the employer, to which the employee has been
'exposed' and 'enriched' solely due to his employment. "182
Even if an invention assignment agreement is valid, a prior employer
seeking to claim ownership of an invention under the assignment contract
must establish that the invention: (1) relates to the employer's business or
the employer's actual or demonstrable anticipated research or develop-
ment, or results from any work performed by the employee for the em-
ployer,"8 3 and (2) was conceived during the employment period.1 14 Al-
though California courts have not addressed the second issue, federal
jurisprudence provides some useful guidelines for determining when con-
ception occurs. Under federal law, conception is the time when the idea
crystallizes in the employee's mind. 85 Although patent law provides that
conception occurs when the inventor has a "specific, settled idea, [or] a
particular solution to the problem at hand" which can be described with
particularity, under contract law, "conception" takes on a broader mean-
ing.1
86
Because it is impossible to tell when an idea crystallizes in an em-
ployee's mind, the courts have used circumstantial evidence such as the
level of difficulty of conceiving the idea, the length of employment, and
the length of time between the termination of employment and the subse-
quent conception to determine when conception occurred."8 7 In Syntex
Ophthalmics, Inc., the defendant, while employed by the plaintiff, devel-
oped new monomers that would yield an oxygen-permeable contact lens
material.' 8 Four days after resigning from his job, the defendant pre-
pared a patent disclosure statement which revealed the discovery of addi-
tional novel siloxane monomers for use in making gas permeable lens
material.' 89 Despite the defendant's claim that this new discovery was
prompted by his having reviewed an article on silicone chemistry some-
time after leaving Syntex, the court held that the defendant conceived the
information as such"); Marc B. Hershovitz, Unhitching The Trailer Clause: The Rights of In-
ventive Employees and Their Employers, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 202 (1995).
182. Ingersoll-Rand, 542 A.2d at 894.
183. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
184. See supra note 174 (typical invention assignment agreement).
185. Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 80 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
186. See American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
187. See Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. 272, 279 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
General Signal Corp., Inc. v. Primary Flow Signal, Inc., 1987 WL 147798, *1, *4 (D. R.I.
1987).
188. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. at273.
189. Id. at 275.
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new invention while employed by the plaintiff.1" Perhaps the court was
convinced by the fact that the defendant copied, almost verbatim, 100
pages of process sheets which he had used while employed at Syntex to
prepare his new patent application."'
Similarly, in General Signal Corp., the defendant worked for the
plaintiff for 22 years, advancing from the position of draftsman to that of
Products Development Manager.1" The defendant signed a contract
agreeing to assign to the plaintiff all inventions and ideas, patentable or
not, made or conceived by the defendant, while employed by the plaintiff
and for six months thereafter (the "trailer clause"). 1" The defendant
subsequently left the plaintiffs employ. Five days after the invention as-
signment agreement expired, the defendant recorded the conception of a
universal flow meter which he later patented. 1" The court granted the
plaintiff equitable assignment of the universal flow meter patent because
the idea was conceived during the defendant's employment period.1 95
The court reasoned:
The perfection of a flow meter proved to be a painstakingly intricate
process involving extensive testing. It is therefore difficult to believe
that after a long and distinguished career with Plaintiff, [Defendant] in
his musing five days after the trailer clause expired for the first time
came up with the idea for the [invention]. Although the word
"Eureka!" has allegedly been uttered by more than one inventor over
the years, the concept at issue does not lend itself to such sudden dis-
covery. The Court finds that the concept of the [patent at issue] must
have existed in [Defendant's] mind before his employment with [Plain-
tiff] ended.... [Furthermore,] [tihe essential physical difference be-
tween the [previous] patent and the [patent at issue] is that the internal
edges of the valve of the [previous] patent are sharp whereas the edges
of the valve of the [patent at issue] are rounded. It is difficult to be-
lieve, and the Court does not believe, that [Defendant] did not conceive
of a flow meter so similar to the [previous flow meter] until after he left
[Plaintiff].
196
Thus, whether an invention was conceived during the employment
period is a fact-intensive inquiry and guided in many ways by common
sense. Typically, the more complex the invention, and the shorter the
period between employment termination and the announcement of the in-
190. Id. at 279.
191. Id. at 275.
192. General Signal Corp., 1987 WL 147798 at *1.
193. Id. at *1-'2.
194. Id. at *2.
195. Id. at *4.
196. Id.
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vention, the more likely it is that the court will find that the invention was
conceived before the employee started his new job."9
In California, a strong policy interest in open competition"'8 has
curtailed the employer's ability to contractually restrain employees from
pursuing comparable employment. So long as the hiring employer does
not condone or participate in the new employee's breach of fiduciary duty
or breach of contract, or misappropriation of trade secrets, it will not in-
cur liability. Moreover, the California courts have struck down non-
competition agreements and severely limited the scope of protection of
non-disclosure agreements."9 In furthering the pro-competition policy,
the California courts would probably follow the federal courts and scruti-
nize an employer's ownership claim of an invention pursuant to an in-
vention assignment agreement because this type of agreement expands the
employer's proprietary right beyond what is afforded under patent and
trade secret law.' Accordingly, an employer considering hiring away its
competitor's employees faces very few restrictions in California.
H. Application of Potential Causes of Action
To illustrate the impact of California law on the hiring practices of
companies in the Silicon Valley, this part of the Note applies the forego-
ing legal rules to situations typically faced by hiring employers in the
Silicon Valley. It will analyze the potential liability of the hiring employer
and the departed employees.
A. Hypothetical
Due to recent expansion, Alpha company needs an additional soft-
ware vice president to manage its new division. Alpha advertises the po-
sition in the newspapers, trade journals, and on the internet. Alpha also
lists the job opening with recruiting firms. After a few weeks, the re-
cruiting firms present to Alpha several qualified candidates who are cur-
rently employed at various companies. Alpha eventually makes an offer
to Vince Peters, a vice president of Beta, Alpha's direct competitor. Al-
pha entices Peters by offering him a thirty percent increase in salary and
stock options. To Alpha's delight, Peters accepts the position.
197. See generally, id.; Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. 272, 279
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
198. See Howard v. Babcock, 6 Cal. 4th 409, 416 (1993) (explaining that a person has a
substantial interest in the unrestrained pursuit of his or her livelihood and must be allowed to
change employers and compete for available business and customers).
199. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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Prior to his departure from Beta, Peters tells his closest engineers
that he is leaving to join Alpha because Alpha has the most amazing state-
of-the-art projects and is very profitable. Shortly after Peters' arrival at
Alpha, Carl Evans, one of the chief engineers who worked under Peters
at Beta, faxes his resume to Alpha. Peters recommends that Evans is a
"must hire" and vouches that Evans is the best engineer Peters has ever
met. Although Alpha does not have an engineering opening, it invites
Evans in for an interview. Evans shines during the interview. Impressed
with Evans' performance and track record, Alpha creates a position for,
and makes an offer to, Evans. To increase its chance of success in hiring
Evans, Alpha invites Evans to attend some of its technical meetings to
give Evans a chance to observe the workplace dynamics between Alpha's
technical employees. Alpha's efforts pay off, and Evans accepts the po-
sition.
Evans turns out to be even better than Alpha has anticipated. Only
six months after joining Alpha, Evans perfects a revolutionary idea that
will significantly increase Alpha's product performance.
Alpha's rosy future is not without obstacles, however. Beta files
suits against Alpha, as well as Peters and Evans. Beta seeks damages
and equitable relief to enjoin Peters from performing as the vice presi-
dent, and Alpha from implementing the revolutionary idea perfected by
Evans. Facing these lawsuits, Alpha finds out that both Peters and Evans
had signed employment contracts with Beta, agreeing not to (1) use or
disclose Beta's proprietary information; (2) compete with Beta for six
months following employment termination; and (3) to recruit other Beta
employees for six months following employment termination. They also
agreed to assign to Beta all inventions made by them while employed and
six months following termination.
B. Analysis
(1) Unfair Competition
The first step in analyzing Alpha's potential liability is to determine
whether Alpha has engaged in predatory hiring, a common unfair com-
petition claim. Alpha's liability under the predatory hiring claim depends
on whether Alpha's sole purpose for hiring Peters and Evans was to de-
stroy Beta's business. 1 Alpha hired Peters to manage a new division of
its business due to recent expansion. Although Alpha hired Evans when
it did not have an opening, it created a position where Evans proved to be
most productive. Indeed, Evans conducted a research and development
201. See supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text (analyzing the sole purpose require-
ment).
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project which resulted in a revolutionary idea. Accordingly, Alpha's
main purpose in hiring Peters and Evans seems to be the utilization of
their expertise, not the destruction of Beta. In fact, there is no evidence
that Alpha sought to destroy Beta, unlike the "we wound UAI again"
memo in Universal Analytics. m
Furthermore, putting the new employees to use is evidence of non-
predatory hiring. 3 Once on board, Peters assumed the vice presidential
responsibilities and Evans assumed the engineering responsibilities.
Thus, Alpha did not hire Peters away just to drive Beta out of business.
Accordingly, any injury Beta suffered from losing Peters was purely in-
cidental, and thus, insufficient to establish that Alpha had a predatory in-
tent.
The court, however, may infer a predatory intent from circumstan-
tial evidence such as targeted recruiting efforts or an unreasonably high
employment compensation offer.' Alpha advertised the vice president
position in the newspapers, trade journals, and on the internet. Further-
more, Alpha listed the position with more than one employment agency
and, like the hiring employer in Universal Analytics, did not direct the
agencies to target Beta. In fact, the head-hunting agencies presented Al-
pha with vice presidential candidates from a variety of companies. This
evidence shows that Alpha's primary motivation was to find a vice presi-
dent with appropriate experience and talent. Likewise, the hiring of Ev-
ans did not indicate that Alpha intended to injure Beta by raiding its em-
ployees. Since Alpha did not have an engineering position open, it did
not recruit Evans. Evans applied to Alpha on his own initiative. Ac-
cordingly, Alpha did not single Beta out by directing all recruiting efforts
at Beta.
In addition to targeted recruiting, significant monetary rewards dis-
proportionate to the new employee's skills and experience are also evi-
dence of predatory hiring.20 In this hypothetical, the courts would have
to consider whether a thirty percent salary increase for a high-tech ex-
ecutive such as Peters is commensurable with the skills and experience
Peters would bring to a new company. Given the intensive competition
for skilled technical employees in the Silicon Valley, a thirty percent in-
crease in salary, albeit higher than the twenty percent increase in Univer-
202. Even with the memo, the court did not find the defendant liable because wounding the
plaintiff was not the defendant's sole purpose. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-
Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1990).
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (analyzing circumstantial evidence of
predatory intent).
205. See Medtronic Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1467 (D. Minn.
1990).
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sal Analytics,2°6 is well within the norm of offers made to technical per-
sonnel. 2°7 Accordingly, Alpha's attractive salary offer to Peters does not
help Beta in establishing its predatory hiring claim. Because it did not
appear that Alpha hired Peters and Evans solely to destroy Beta's busi-
ness, Alpha is probably not liable for predatory hiring.
(2) Breach Of Fiduciary Duty
Next, the court should determine whether Peters and Evans breached
their respective fiduciary duties to Beta. Alpha may also be implicated in
wrongdoing if it condoned and benefited from Peters' or Evans' breach
of fiduciary duty toward Beta. It is a breach of fiduciary duty for an of-
ficer-employee to solicit the departure of other employees before resign-
ing." Having been a vice president for Beta, Peters would be held to a
higher fiduciary standard than that of non-officer employees.' °9 Thus,
Peters' fiduciary duty to Beta precludes him from soliciting the departure
of other employees before leaving Beta. In this hypothetical it is ques-
tionable whether Peters solicited Evans' departure from Beta. Peters'
conversation with the engineers about Alpha's exciting projects and prof-
itability is in no way similar to the active recruitment by the president of
Bancroft-Whitney.10 Peters did not ask Evans to leave Beta and join Al-
pha. Peters, however, may have indirectly enticed Evans by telling him
about the positive aspects of Alpha. Thus, Peters arguably played a part
in Evans' decision to leave Beta. The court, however, draws the line of
liability on the basis of affirmative solicitation. 21' Because Evans initiated
the hiring process by faxing to Alpha an unsolicited resume, the court
probably would not hold Peters liable for breaching his fiduciary duty.
Although Evans would be held to a lesser standard because he was
not an officer-employee of Beta, he still owed Beta a duty of loyalty.
Participating in one employer's operation while still employed by another
employer constitutes a wrongful transfer of loyalty. 212 Whether Evans
breached his fiduciary duty when he went to Alpha's meetings before
leaving Beta depends on the degree of his participation in these meetings.
Alpha invited Evans to its technical meetings to observe the working re-
lations between the members of Alpha's technical staff after it had ex-
206. The court found the twenty percent increase in salary commensurable with the em-
ployees' experience levels. Universal Analytics, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1259.
207. Interview with Do Bui, Regional Director of Vital Link Computing (a recruiting firm
based in the San Francisco Bay Area), at his office (Aug. 2, 1996).
208. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
212. See Fowler v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 196 Cal. App. 3d 34, 41 (1987).
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tended a job offer to Evans. Alpha used the invitation as a selling tool to
increase its chances of luring Evans. Evans, on the other hand, did not
need to impress Alpha at the meetings because he had received Alpha's
offer. Thus, the court would probably hold that Evans did not transfer
his loyalty from Beta to Alpha.
Because Peters and Evans did not transfer their loyalty to Alpha be-
fore their departure from Beta, they did not breach their fiduciary duties.
Peters did not affirmatively solicit Evans' departure, and Evans likely did
not contribute information at the meeting. Accordingly, Peters and Ev-
ans did not breach their fiduciary duty. Therefore, Alpha would not be
held liable for breach of fiduciary duty under California law.
(3) Trade Secret Misappropriation
At issue under the trade secret misappropriation claim is Evans'
revolutionary idea that he completed six months after joining Alpha. To
successfully claim ownership of this idea and to preclude Alpha from im-
plementing it under trade secret law, Beta would be required to show that
the goals, as well as the means, of the idea were completed by Evans be-
fore he left Beta's employ.213 Moreover, Beta would have to establish
that the idea did not consist solely of general programming concepts.214
Here, the concepts that Evans brought with him to Alpha were not
trade secrets because they were not specific ideas accompanied by meth-
ods of implementation. Indeed, it took Evans six months after joining
Alpha to conceive and perfect the idea. To do this, Evans undoubtedly
used general programming methods and engineering principles that he
had learned at Beta. However, he is not liable for trade secret misappro-
priation because general methods and principles do not qualify as trade
secrets. Furthermore, the expertise, skills, and knowledge that Evans
gained as a result of his tenure at Beta are not trade secrets owned by
Beta. Thus, Peters and Evans were free to draw upon their general
knowledge, experience, memory, and skill to perform their duties in their
new positions at Alpha. Accordingly, Evans and Peters did not misap-
propriate Beta's trade secrets.
Although the above outcome would result under the majority rule
that knowledge and skills of an employee are not trade secrets of his em-
213. See Gabriel Co. v. Talley Indus., 137 U.S.P.Q. 630, 633 (D. Ariz. 1963) (offering
protection only for a "perfected product or process"); Packard Instrument Co. v. Reich, 412
N.E.2d 617, 623 (Ill. App. 1980) (extending protection only to "particularized plans and proc-
esses"); Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 Ili. App. 2d 261, 278 (1969) ("If Vendo has discovered the
means for achieving its goal, we might well have had a different view as to whether Vendo had
a trade secret."); Chomerics, Inc. v. Ehrreich, 421 N.E.2d 453, 459 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981).
214. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (analyzing Winston Research Corp. and
SMC Corp).
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ployer, the minority rule of inevitable disclosure would yield a different
result.215 The minority rule holds that an employee's knowledge is a
trade secret of his former employer if the employee cannot perform his
new job's duties without necessarily calling upon trade secrets learned
during his prior employment.216 Because Peters' and Evans' positions at
Alpha were similar to those held at Beta, they may be liable under this
minority view which has been embraced by a few courts outside Califor-
nia.
Similar to Redmond in PepsiCo., Peters and Evans came from Al-
pha's direct competitor to assume a comparable position. While serving
as Beta's software development vice president, Peters undoubtedly ac-
quired knowledge of Beta's software development plans. Likewise, Ev-
ans undoubtedly gained technical knowledge while at Beta. Thus, under
the inevitable disclosure theory, it is conceivable that the court would
enjoin Peters and Evans from continuing their responsibilities at Alpha,
and Peters and Evans would probably be held liable for trade secret mis-
appropriation.
Assuming that the inevitable disclosure theory applies, Alpha could
also be held liable for trade secret misappropriation. It is likely that Al-
pha knew, or had reason to know, that Peters and Evans used their
knowledge and experience derived from their employment at Beta. Be-
cause Alpha and Beta are direct competitors, any knowledge or experi-
ence that an employee has about one company's technology would be
highly relevant to the other company's business. Additionally, Peters and
Evans assumed positions that were similar to those they held at Beta;
thus, they inevitably would use their knowledge and experience gained
from working at Beta in their new jobs.
These facts are probably sufficient to impose a duty on Alpha to in-
vestigate whether Peters and Evans have violated trade secret laws. Be-
cause Alpha failed to halt Peters' and Evans' actions, it would also be
implicated in the trade secret misappropriation. However, the discussion
of the liability under the inevitable disclosure theory is academic because
the California courts would likely reject this theory.2 17
(4) Breach Of Employment Contract
Next, the court should determine whether Peters and Evans breached
their employment contracts with Beta, because such breaches could im-
plicate Alpha in unfair competition. Peters and Evans signed (1) a non-
competition provision; (2) a non-disclosure provision; (3) a non-
215. See supra notes 140-58 (analyzing the inevitable disclosure theory).
216. See id.
217. However, one court has left in place a preliminary injunction under this theory. See
supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
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solicitation provision; and (4) an invention assignment provision. Be-
cause non-competition agreements are generally unenforceable under
California law, 2 '8 Alpha, Peters, and Evans may safely dismiss this pro-
vision as being nothing more than a scarecrow.
In addition to the non-competition provision, Peters and Evans also
agreed not to use or disclose Beta's proprietary information. Non-
disclosure agreements do not afford an employer protection beyond trade
secrets.2 19 Thus, the resolution of this breach of contract claim under the
non-disclosure provision depends on whether Peters and Evans have mis-
appropriated Beta's trade secrets, as analyzed above. Accordingly, the
confidentiality provision should not cause Alpha, Peters, or Evans any
additional concern.
The non-solicitation provision, on the other hand, is more trouble-
some. It precludes an employee from soliciting his co-workers' depar-
tures for a defined period after the employee's termination or resigna-
tion.' It is questionable whether Peters solicited Evans' departure from
Beta. Although Peters did not ask Evans to leave Beta and join Alpha,
Peters may have enticed Evans indirectly by telling Evans that Alpha was
working on the most advanced state-of-the-art technology and was very
profitable. The Loral court, however, emphasized that only affirmative
solicitation is prohibited. 221 The court seemed to define the scope of li-
ability based on who calls whom first about the employment opportu-
nity.' Because Evans initiated the hiring process by faxing to Alpha an
unsolicited resume, the court probably would not hold Peters liable for
breaching the non-solicitation provision.
Lastly, the invention assignment provision may have serious impli-
cations for Alpha. If the court finds that the idea belongs to Beta under
the invention assignment contract, Alpha not only loses the opportunity to
commercialize the idea, but it also loses the idea to its direct competitor.
Thus, the court would need to determine whether this invention assign-
ment provision is enforceable; and if enforceable, whether it covers the
idea. An invention assignment agreement is enforceable if the employ-
ment is conditioned on its execution.' Beta, like most high-tech em-
ployers, probably has its new employees sign this agreement as part of
the job acceptance, or on the first day of employment. Assuming this is
218. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-02 (stating covenants not to compete are typi-
cally unenforceable).
219. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
221. See Loral Corp., 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
222. Id.
223. The condition of employment is one way to satisfy the contract consideration require-
ment. Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185 Cal. App. 3d 438, 448 (1986).
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the procedure Beta used when it hired Evans, he is bound by the terms of
the invention assignment provision.
According to the terms of the employment contract, only inventions
relating to Beta's business that Evans conceived during the employment
period would have to be assigned to Beta. Because Alpha and Beta are
direct competitors, an invention benefiting Alpha would likely relate to
Beta's business. Thus, Beta could easily establish the first requirement of
the agreement. Although the first factor is met, Beta still must prove that
the idea was conceived while Evans was still in its employ. Unlike the
employees in Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. and General Signal Corp,' who
claimed to have conceived an invention approximately five days after the
expiration of the assignment agreement, it took Evans six months to per-
fect the idea. This can hardly be characterized as a "sudden flash of in-
genuity." Also, given the fast pace of technological progress in the Sili-
con Valley, a six-month old idea probably would have become obsolete.
It is therefore highly improbable that the idea had "crystallized" in Ev-
ans' mind before he left Beta's employ. Consequently, the court would
likely rule that the idea was conceived after Evans joined Alpha, and find
that Evans did not breach the invention assignment agreement.
Evans' invention assignment provision also contains a trailer clause,
requiring him to assign inventions that he makes within six months of his
departure from Beta. Given California's pro-competition stance, the
California courts probably would follow the majority rule and limit the
scope of the trailer clause to protect only trade secrets. Thus, whether
Evans violated the trailer clause turns on whether Evans appropriated
Beta's trade secrets.
In this hypothetical, which presents a typical hiring scenario in the
Silicon Valley, the hiring employer and the new employees would not be
liable to the employees' prior employer.
M1. Best Practices
Below is a list of recommended practices that will help an employer
avoid liability.
A. The Recruiting Stage:
1.DO advertise the position in appropriate publications. Evidence
that the company advertises the position and uses employment agencies
shows that the company's primary motivation is to find employees with
224. See supra notes 186-196 and accompanying text (discussing Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc.
and General Signal Corp.).
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appropriate experience and talent, and not to injure a particular competi-
tor.
2.DO NOT target one company for recruits. Targeting the recruit-
ing effort at one company may be circumstantial evidence of an intent to
"raid."
3.DO NOT direct employment agencies to recruit employees from
one particular competitor. Directing employment agencies to target one
competitor for recruits may be evidence of a conspiracy between the em-
ployer and the agencies to drive the competitor out of business by usurp-
ing its crucial employees.
4.DO NOT accept confidential information regarding the employee's
former co-workers (such as salaries) from the new employee. Revealing
such confidential information before terminating current employment is a
breach of fiduciary duty. If the company accepts such information, it
would be deemed to have participated in the employee's breach, and thus
would be guilty of unfair competition.
5.DO NOT encourage employees of a competitor to leave "en-
masse." Mass termination of employment may be used as circumstantial
evidence showing a predatory intent.
6.DO NOT hire a competitor's employees to drive the competitor
out of business. Hiring one's competitor's employees solely to destroy
competition is forbidden.
7.DO NOT drive a competitor out of business in order to hire its
employees. Doing so may be deemed as unlawful, egregious conduct.
8.DO pursue colleagues of the new employee who, on their own
initiative, approach the company regarding employment opportunities.
Have them sign a declaration, stating that they initiated the contact with
the company and were not enlisted by their ex-co-worker. The company
is always free to hire potential employees who approach the company on
their own initiative.
B. The Offer / Acceptance Stage
1.DO NOT make offers that are disproportionately high in compari-
son with the employee's skills and experience. Such offers may be used
as circumstantial evidence of predatory intent.
2.DO include a provision in the offer letter that prohibits the em-
ployee from disclosing his prior employer's trade secrets and confidential
information. This provision should be signed concurrently with job ac-
ceptance. Such a provision would put the new employee on notice that
the hiring company does not condone such action. Moreover, if the em-
ployee does use his prior employer's trade secrets, the provision would
serve as evidence that the company did not participate in the employee's
wrongful conduct.
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3.DO review the employment contract between employee and
his/her prior employer. The company may have a duty to inquire into the
new employee's contractual obligations to his prior employer.
4.DO require the employee to refrain from actively recruiting his
former employer's personnel until the contract expires, if the employee
signed an agreement with the prior employer which contained a non-
solicitation provision. The company will be guilty of unfair competition
if it participates in, and benefits from, its new employee's breach of con-
tract with his prior employer.
C. Employment Stage
1.DO put the new employees to work immediately after they are
hired. Non-use is circumstantial evidence of predatory intent.
2.DO prohibit new employees from taking any written or electronic
materials from their former employers. This will put the employee on
notice that the company does not condone the use of another company's
proprietary information.
3.DO investigate the types of projects and the projects' status if the
employee had signed an invention assignment agreement. This is a pre-
cautionary measure to guard against the use of the employee's former
employer's protectable information.
4.DO NOT place the employee in a position where he feels pres-
sured to use his former employer's protectable trade secrets or confiden-
tial information. This is a precautionary method to prevent the employee
from disclosing forbidden information.
5.DO investigate the ownership of a contribution by an employee if
there is a reason to suspect that the employee may be using his previous
employer's trade secrets. The company is under a duty to investigate if it
has constructive notice that its new employee may be using trade secrets
belonging to his prior employer.
Conclusion
It is abundantly clear that California has a very strong public policy
of open competition. For example, while many states uphold covenants
restraining employees from competing against their former employers,
California passed a statute declaring that such covenants are unenforce-
able.' Similarly, California courts have repeatedly stated that competi-
225. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 ("[E]very contract by which anyone is re-
strained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.")
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tors are free to solicit each other's employees. 6 There are only a few
forbidden actions: hiring a competitor's employee to steal trade secrets or
confidential information, or to hinder competition. Notwithstanding the
recent proliferation of lawsuits against employers who hire their com-
petitors' employees, the California courts should continue the pro-
competition tradition. Thanks to this tradition, technology firms in the
Silicon Valley have flourished by building on one another's efforts. To
depart from this tradition is to undermine the foundation of Silicon Val-
ley. With the support of the courts, employers with a genuine need for
technical talents and expertise may continue to compete for employees.
226. See Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 573,
577 (1994); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 26 (Ct. App. 1968); Muggil v. Reuben
H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965); Buxbom v. Smith, 145 P.2d. 305, 310
(Cal. 1944).
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